The disintegration of the Soviet Union was still a fantasy in late 1989, when the Red Empire converted another fantasy to reality and allowed large scale Jewish emigration to resume. Since then, the population of Israel has been boosted by more than 800,000 immigrants in slightly more than eight years -- most of them from the former Soviet Union, .

The Hosts: Shock and Regrouping
Although the proportions of hosts to immigrants was much more favorable than in the 1940s and 1950s, there was a sense of inundation nevertheless, fueled by the apprehension that all of Soviet Jewry would empty into an economically recessed, politically pressured Israel in one go.

To counter this, an immigrant-absorption surtax (5% of income tax) was levied in fiscal 1991-1993. The government backtracked on "direct absorption" and commissioned the construction of thousands of dwellings, mostly in peripheral areas, for newcomers only. Cumbersome zoning and planning rules were swept aside. The intent, as in the 1950s, was to steer immigrants to the national periphery and, in a new wrinkle, to protect the domestic housing market from being swamped by the tide.

The policy failed on both accounts because these newcomers had known far greater housing hardship in the USSR than anything Israel could dish out. Olim families whose members had employable skills doubled up in rented apartments in job intensive urban areas; those of lesser skills and the elderly gravitated to outlying towns where an immigrant rent subsidy, originally set at $300 per month irrespective of location, destroyed cheap rental housing and gave Israel its first experience of homelessness among non-immigrants.

Despite the planners' intentions, the geographical dispersion of the 1990s olim is not substantially different from that of the rest of the population, although the Southern District (principally Be'ersheva) has recently become attractive, partly because of the cultural infrastructure established there by Soviet olim of the 1970s.

Immigrants From the Former USSR

The immigrants of the 1990s were the first in many decades to view Israel as a place to improve their material circumstances. The result was (and is) an influx of non-Jews, most of them eligible under the Law of Return. Their number has been estimated at around 200,000, or 25% of the total wave, and it has even been alleged that non-Jews accounted for a majority of "olim" in 1996-1997.

The Economy: "Absorbed at Work"
The 1990s aliyah made its first economic impact on the unemployment rate (upward), on business-sector wages (downward), and on demand, especially for consumer goods and housing (massively higher). In late 1997, the process was in mid-stride, the demand side effects exhausted and the main supply side effect -- improved labor productivity because of acculturation -- yet to come. This generation of olim seems to have made the fastest economic adjustment of all immigration "waves." As their unemployment rate converges with that of the non-immigrant labor force, so does their level of consumption. In the highest ticket item, housing, their home ownership rate (75%) approximates that of non-immigrants.

One "mistake of the 1950s" was the failure to match immigrants' skills to jobs. Back then, the government held all the reins. In the 1990s, the government proclaimed this kind of "matchmaking" to be its goal, but relinquished most of the reins needed to accomplish it. There have been few job programs specifically for Russians, although programs for olim from "countries of distress" continue and private foundations engage in affirmative action. Nor have immigrants been routed to the public sector, as they were in the 1970s; their representation there resembles that of the population at large.

The Israeli job market greeted masses of immigrants with double-digit unemployment and then accommodated them earnestly, if not always commensurably with their skills. That the domestic market absorbed them at all is mostly attributable to the immigrants themselves -- their occupational flexibility and the economic growth that they generated.

The match-up of credentials and jobs is poorest in immigrants' first jobs in Israel. Among last-quarter 1993 immigrants, some 25% of the university trained professionals from the USSR/FSU were employed as unskilled laborers in their second year in Israel; another third earned their paychecks as skilled industrial workers. A similar pattern of occupational integration occurred among those who had worked in liberal professions and technical occupations before immigration. Not surprisingly, they show signs of psychological maladjustment on the job and provoke resentment among socially disadvantaged non-immigrants, whose positions are under attack for macroeconomic reasons. Perhaps for this reason, the share of olim who had worked in academic professions "back there" contracted from 36% among late-1990 immigrants to 24% among late-1993 arrivals.

Immigrants Arriving From the Former USSR

Overall, late-1993 immigrants surveyed in the second quarter of 1996 were more poorly integrated into occupations corresponding to their credentials than were late-1990 immigrants, proving that it takes time to become fully integrated. However, the more recent immigrants are also showing less willingness to narrow the disparities through study. The first indicator is their command of Hebrew. A six-month tuition-free ulpan (Hebrew-language course) is a standard feature of absorption programs; many job-related courses include supplementary ulpanim. As a group, 1993 immigrants are less proficient in Hebrew than 1991 immigrants. In their second year in Israel, 54% of 1990 arrivals could conduct a simple conversation in Hebrew, but only 44% of 1993 arrivals could; 26% of 1993 immigrants reported that they could not do so, as against 20% of 1990 immigrants. Some 38% of immigrants who arrived in 1990 could write a simple letter in Hebrew during their second year in the country; 28% of 1993 immigrants could do so. The pattern recurred in vocational training (including retraining, adaptation, and certification studies): the late-1993 immigrants were less likely to have taken such courses than those of late 1990.

In or Out: Cultural Absorption
Many Israelis initially greeted the great aliyah by remarking triumphantly that "Russian is heard in the streets." Had they listened carefully, they might have noticed that one of the expressions uttered was nye kulturniy "uncultured" -- a severe insult in Russian -- and that it was being said about them. Seven years later, as the immigrant masses fit in and settle down uneventfully, an important minority of Israelis and "Russians" relate to each other with cultural rejection. As FSU immigrants of all ages have attained equality if not dominance in many fields of Israeli culture, others have developed Russophone enclaves in the cities, voluntarily reenacting the government's "mistake of the 1950s" in segregating Mizrahim by dispatching them to the periphery.

"Russians" have started many cultural clubs with various orientations that are frequented by thousands of adult immigrants. A typical club offers lectures in Russian and Yiddish and hosts concerts and recitals for olim performers and visiting musicians from the FSU. Pro-integration clubs, generally run by 1970s olim, aspire to fashion a Jewish-Israeli identity specific to Russian olim. Segregationist clubs attract intellectuals from the major Russian cities and their events focus on matters Russian, partly in protest against the quality of Israeli culture and society. The integrationists have the upper hand in this tug-of-war, because: (1) The surroundings favor their cause, as absorption difficulties wear down separatist tendencies and (2) Even though the melting pot has been cooled off, it is bad form to preach segregationism openly.

Immigrants cull most of their information and derive most of their entertainment from Russophone Israeli media (domestic programming on cable TV and Voice of Israel radio) and Russian cable TV, which has subscription rates comparable to those of Hebrew cable TV among non-immigrants. Some stations in Russia carry Israeli advertising.

In political culture, the olim pursue one agenda, their advancement, in two ways: by means of an immigrant party and by integration into existing parties. The 174,994 votes cast in May 1996 for Yisrael Ba'aliyah, "Israel Through Immigration," do not express segregationist sentiment as such -- the party's platform preaches integration -- but reflect disenchantment with the intercessionary public activism pursued by olim and their advocates until the party was founded in February 1996. Yisrael Ba'aliyah's centrist posture is at odds with the right-wing leanings of the Russophone media, and its political behavior balances concern for general social justice issues with immigrant absorption causes and pride issues, such as the right to veto ambassadorial appointments to FSU countries. Its payoff in the 1998 budget deliberations, derived from its coalition agreement, added up to NIS 400 million for miscellaneous social, community, small business, housing, and training programs focusing on olim, including those from Ethiopia. Its method of obtaining them -- "If our demands are not met, Netanyahu will not have a coalition tomorrow" -- illustrate how domestically kulturniy Yisrael Ba'aliyah and its voters have become.