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Demonstrations aside, the Mothers' main goal was to line up public figures behind their cause. Only one came aboard in 1997 -- MK Yossi Beilin (Labour). His convictions predate the helicopter crash and the Mothers; as early as January 28, 1997, he urged summary unilateral disengagement, arguing that Israel and its forces had become sitting ducks. On November 9, Beilin launched the "Movement to Leave Lebanon Peacefully." Its supporters include seven Knesset members: Haim Ramon, Nissim Zvili, Yona Yahav, and Yael Dayan of Labour, Dedi Zucker and Naomi Chazan of Meretz, and Zvi Weinberg of Yisrael Ba'aliya; representatives of the original Four Mothers group; and miscellaneous public figures. Its platform includes "alternative security arrangements" and adequate provisions for the members of the SLA. The military, too, debated the security-zone policy vigorously. Initially, defense spokesmen implied that criticism would demoralize the troops and/or give aid and comfort to the enemy. In mid-November, however, OC Northern Command Amiram Levine was quoted as having told a closed meeting of senior officers that Israel should hit Hizbullah hard and then withdraw from Lebanon, unilaterally but gradually. His logic: Syria would find the place as uncontrollable as Israel has. Another IDF hypothesis, also expressed in mid-November by a brigadier-general, was that Hizbullah itself would become mired in local affairs without the IDF to kick around. The opponents of unilateral withdrawal include enough players to pacify the entire Middle East if only they could agree about that. Domestic critics included heavyweight Labour colleagues of Beilin's as well as representatives of Jewish political forces to Labour's left that favor a full pullback from the West Bank. President Weizman advised the politicians to extricate the IDF by concluding terms with Syria that would include Lebanon, which he termed a "Syrian province" (September 8). Although Prime Minister Netanyahu criticized public discussion of withdrawal as a source of inspiration to Hizbullah, the debate went on within his cabinet, too, where Michael Eitan and David Levy (September 7) urged reassessment and a discussion of "the Lebanese question." Abroad, a unilateral Israeli withdrawal was opposed by Syria, Iran, and even Hizbullah, all of whom want Israel to continue spilling its blood. To strengthen Israel's anti-withdrawal forces, Hizbullah became more forthright about its intention to continue attacking Israel after withdrawal. Lebanon also toughened its posture. Once willing to guarantee security up to the Israeli border, from the autumn of 1997 it undertook to do so only after Israel and Syria conclude a political accord. In October, SLA commander General Antoine Lahad expressed his objection to a unilateral pullback by threatening to turn his forces against the IDF should such a withdrawal begin. Testing the waters, Defense Minister Mordechai proposed a "Jezzine-first" plan: a trial withdrawal of SLA-affiliated forces from the Jezzine enclave north of the Security Zone, the void to be filled by the Lebanese Army. On December 19, after lengthy American-mediated negotiations, Israel and the SLA opened a crossing at Kafr Falous, near the town of Jezzine, for the first time since 1985, to permit local residents to travel to Sidon and the rest of Lebanon. Israel regarded this as a confidence building measure vis-à-vis the government of Lebanon, possibly to be followed by an extension of Lebanese government control to Jezzine proper and perhaps further south. On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously for a full troop withdrawal from Lebanon by July. The expectation was that such a withdrawal would be part of an agreement with Syria and Lebanon. However, after negotiations with Syria broke down and Syrian President Assad’s refusal to continue talks with Israel, such coordination was not possible. Israel began its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on May 22, 2000 and it was quickly completed by May 24 in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 425. According to Resolution 425, the U.N. will take action to fill the vacuum that is created following the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and deploy appropriate armed forces to restore effective authority in the area. Israel has reiterated that it remains committed to its goal of concluding peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon and hopes that following its withdrawal, peace and security will be restored to both sides of the international border. Israel also expects that the Government of Lebanon will take effective control of southern Lebanon and fulfill the remaining obligations of Resolution 425, particularly, the restoration of international peace and security to both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border. As part of its obligations under Resolution 425, the Government of Lebanon will bear the responsibility for preventing terrorist attacks against Israel from within its borders. Israel maintains its right to act forcefully if terrorist attacks on northern Israel continue after the withdrawal. As Israeli troops were withdrawing from southern Lebanon, members of the SLA and their families fled their homes in fear of advancing Hezbollah forces. Israel is admitting SLA personnel and their families into Israel. They are being sent to hotels and guest houses throughout Israel and Interior Ministry staff will visit each family and provide them with one-year residency permits that include the right to work, health insurance and other social benefits. Special arrangements are being made for the schooling of their children. On May 24, 2000, Israel completed the withdrawal of its forces from southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak pledged during his March 1999 election campaign to withdraw Israeli troops from Lebanon by July 2000.
Staunching Terrorism Responses to Terrorism The Mashaal Affair POWs and MIAs
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